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JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO THE COLLATERAL 
IMPACT OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS:  
IS TRUE CHANGE IN THE OFFING? 
NORA V. DEMLEITNER* 
In response to 
Jason A. Cade, Return of the JRAD 
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 36 (2015) 
Judicial opposition to disproportionate sentences and the long-term impact of 
criminal records is growing, at least in the Eastern District of New York. With the 
proliferation and harshness of collateral consequences and the hurdles in overcoming 
a criminal record, judges have asked for greater proportionality and improved chances 
for past offenders to get a fresh start. The combined impact of punitiveness and a 
criminal record is not only debilitating to the individual but also to their families and 
communities.  
A criminal case against a noncitizen who will be subject to deportation and a 
decade-long ban on reentry and three different requests for expungement will 
demonstrate how three federal judges struggled with the long-term effects of the 
current sentencing and collateral consequences regime. These cases exemplify both 
judicial creativity and judicial impotence, as the courts have to call upon the support of 
other actors within the executive and legislative branches for change, in these 
individual cases and systemically.  
These judicial critics of the current approach argue within an emerging 
normative framework that is coming to dominate the societal discourse on punishment. 
Increasingly some offenders are deemed “worthy” of receiving our assistance in 
reintegration. They are generally nonviolent first offenders, those with an unblemished 
record save for the offense of conviction, those who have been gainfully employed or 
desperately want to work, and those who have cared for their children. They present no 
danger to the community, and their continued punishment may negatively impact them, 
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their surroundings, and ultimately the country. On the other hand, those labeled violent 
or sex offenders or terrorists are being considered dangerous, unredeemable, and 
deserving of the harshness the criminal justice system has brought to bear on them. The 
specific categorization of offenses, the definitions of terms, and the categorization of 
offenders remain fluid, contingent, and subject to constant revision. Still, these judicial 
efforts expand on the incipient efforts at full reintegration of some of those with a 
criminal record. Whether their challenges will resonate with their colleagues and in 
other branches of government remains to be seen. 
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Jason Cade’s essay Return of the JRAD uses a sentencing decision 
issued by Judge Jack Weinstein, an icon of the federal judiciary, as its 
starting point.1 Judge Weinstein noted in his memorandum opinion that he 
will consider the negative impact of likely deportation on the defendant in 
his sentencing decisions, as permitted under Second Circuit case law.2 
 
 1  Jason A. Cade, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 36, 36 (2015). The 
decision is United States v. Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d 468 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). On Judge Weinstein, 
see for example, Jeffrey B. Morris, Jack Weinstein: Judicial Strategist, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 279 
(2015).  
 2  See United States v. Chong, 13-CR-570, 2014 WL 4773978, at *1, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 
2014) (noting that the Second Circuit relatively recently overturned precedent to permit district 
court judges to factor deportation into sentencing decisions, while a few other circuits still 
prohibit such consideration). Because of the harshness of their nature, deportations are considered 
to be a “particularly severe penalty.” See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360, 365 (2010) 
(observing that “deportation is a particularly severe penalty” and that, in light of substantial 
legislative changes, “[t]he drastic measure of deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable 
for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Angela M. Banks, Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional 
Deportation, 62 EMORY L.J. 1243, 1291–96 (2013) (detailing negative consequences of 
deportation for deportees, their families, and the United States). However, there is no principled 
reason not to factor other collateral sanctions into the overall sentence or to impose them as 
separate sanctions. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: 
The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753, 755–
56 (2000) (suggesting that U.S. states adopt a modified version of the German 
 
152 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 91 
 
Going forward, he will also make it his practice to issue a “non-
deportation” recommendation to the immigration court “[w]here credible 
evidence has been proffered demonstrating that deportation is likely to 
unreasonably traumatize United States-born children of a deportable 
criminal defendant.”3 That recommendation, largely legally irrelevant, 
moves Professor Cade to call for a “return of the JRAD,” a formerly 
binding judicial recommendation against deportation, which allowed the 
sentencing judge to mandate that no deportation occur. In the days of 
robust anti-discretion, anti-judicial sentiment, and fervent support for 
determinative and even mandatory sentencing, Congress abolished the 
JRAD while over time expanding grounds for criminal deportation.4 
Judge Weinstein’s decision highlights the severity of the immigration 
scheme. Indeed, harshness underlies much of the U.S. criminal justice 
system and the entire collateral sanctions regime, of which deportations are 
just one, though perhaps the most debilitating sanction. Collateral 
consequences restrict the civil, political, and economic rights of those with 
a criminal record.5 Often they befall a defendant automatically upon 
conviction, sometimes unbeknownst to the judge, the prosecutor, the 
defendant’s lawyer, and the defendant.6 Many of them last well beyond the 
 
disenfranchisement law which makes denial of the right to vote a separate sanction to be imposed 
by the judge at sentencing upon commission of a small select group of offenses); Nora V. 
Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing 
Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 (1999) [hereinafter Demleitner, Preventing 
Internal Exile] (recommending that collateral sanctions be imposed openly in court as part of a 
criminal justice sanction). 
 3  Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 470–71. The Judge also recommends work release “where the 
defendant held a full-time job prior to his arrest.” Id. at 471; see also infra Section II.C (noting 
the relevance of work record, work ethic, and having children). 
 4  During that time Congress implemented the federal sentencing guidelines, expanded 
mandatory minimum sanctions, augmented the panoply of collateral sanctions, and increased 
criminal grounds for mandatory deportation. See, e.g., Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, 
supra note 2 (discussing the history of collateral sanctions and consequences); Daniel Kanstroom, 
Deportation and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. REV. 771, 772 (2000) (examining 
the impact of expansion of criminal deportation grounds); Evan Bernick & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., 
Reconsidering Mandatory Minimum Sentences: The Arguments for and Against Potential 
Reforms, LEGAL MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 10, 2014, at 1, 2, 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM114.pdf (discussing the modern history of 
mandatory minimum sentences). 
 5  See TASK FORCE ON COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION 
OF CONVICTED PERSONS, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3d ed. 
2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_ 
newsletter/crimjust_standards_collateralsanctionwithcommentary.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 
ABA STANDARDS ON COLLATERAL SANCTIONS] (categorizing collateral sanctions and 
addressing them individually). 
 6  Project Description, ABA NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONVICTION, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/description/ (last visited July 23, 2016) 
(“[C]ollateral consequences are scattered throughout the codebooks and frequently unknown even 
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defendant’s release from the supervision of the criminal justice system 
itself.7 In addition to formal collateral sanctions, convictions tend to have 
lifelong ramifications.8 These are often referred to as disqualifications or, 
more generally, as collateral consequences.9 While collateral sanctions flow 
directly from a criminal conviction because of state action, collateral 
consequences result indirectly.10 The latter may stem from discretionary 
governmental action or the decisions of licensing bodies or private actors, 
such as landlords or employers.11 
Two of Judge Weinstein’s fellow judges in the Eastern District of 
New York recently dealt with the long-term impact of criminal records on 
individuals. In Doe v. United States (Doe I),12 Judge Gleeson granted an 
individual’s request to have her old federal fraud conviction expunged 
because of the negative impact it had on her ability to get and retain 
employment.13 Even though Judge Gleeson acknowledged that employers 
may act rationally when letting a home health aide go after learning about 
 
to those responsible for their administration and enforcement.”); see also ABA STANDARDS ON 
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 5, at 21, 25–26 (adopting standards that require the 
legislative collection and setting out of collateral sanctions and procedural notification of 
defendant prior to judicial acceptance of guilty plea). 
 7  Removal carries with it a years-long exclusion from the United States, depending on the 
circumstances of the removal. See, e.g., POST-DEPORTATION HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, CTR. FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INT’L JUSTICE AT BOS. COLL., RETURNING TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER 
DEPORTATION: A GUIDE TO ASSESS YOUR ELIGIBILITY 8 (2014) (outlining deportation grounds 
and attendant exclusion periods). In some states, denial of the franchise for certain criminal 
convictions can last a lifetime. See, e.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 1 (2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Felony-Disenfranchisement-Primer.pdf (summarizing state felony 
disenfranchisement restrictions, including two that disenfranchise permanently for certain felony 
offenses). 
 8  See Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 31 (2010) (arguing for the expansion of a Padilla-like duty on 
defense counsel to “advise clients about at least some reasonably foreseeable, important legal 
consequences that are triggered by the fact of conviction” because of their long-term, debilitating 
impact). See generally JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 8 (2015) (asking 
whether the “lifetime forfeitures, disqualifications, and ineligibilities imposed on persons with 
criminal records” can be justified).  
 9  ABA STANDARDS ON COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 5, at 15 (distinguishing 
definitionally between “collateral sanctions” and “discretionary disqualifications”). 
Commentators frequently use the term “collateral consequences” broadly to describe all negative 
effects on a criminal offender. See id. at 7 n.2 (“The term ‘collateral consequences’ . . . includes 
both those consequences that occur by operation of law at the time of conviction . . . and those 
that occur as a result of some subsequent intervening event or discretionary decision . . . .”). 
 10  See id. at 7 n.2 (“In criminal justice literature, the term ‘collateral consequences’ is also 
sometimes used to refer to the social effects of incarceration.”). 
 11  See Project Description, supra note 6 (describing various collateral consequences facing 
criminal offenders); see also JACOBS, supra note 8, at 4–7 (same). 
 12  Doe v. United States (Doe I), 110 F. Supp. 3d 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 13  Id. at 449. 
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her conviction for healthcare fraud, in light of Doe’s background, he 
determined that the thirteen-year-old conviction should be expunged.14 
Ultimately he found the employment impact “excessive and counter-
productive.”15 The Department of Justice (DOJ) appealed Judge Gleeson’s 
decision to the Second Circuit, arguing that federal judges have no 
authority to expunge or seal convictions.16 The Second Circuit agreed.17 
The Department’s appeal is surprising in light of its involvement in reentry 
efforts for those released from prison and the Justice Reinvestment 
Initiative, both designed to assist offenders with reintegration.18  
A few months after Judge Gleeson’s decision, Judge Dearie 
confronted a very similar request, made by a woman who had been 
convicted of bank fraud twenty-two years earlier.19 In contrast to Doe who 
had been denied and lost employment because of her criminal conviction, 
Stephenson, the petitioner before Judge Dearie, asked for an expungement 
to avoid future ramifications from her prior conviction on her chosen career 
path.20 Judge Dearie denied the request, emphasizing the high threshold for 
an expungement.21 Like Judge Weinstein, he directed his remarks at an 
outside body—the licensing board for nurses—urging them to grant 
Stephenson a license despite her conviction.22 Judge Dearie also called on 
Congress to enact expungement legislation, on the President to issue 
pardons, on the Department of Justice to no longer oppose expungement 
petitions unless there is a compelling government interest, and on the 
 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. at 456. 
 16  Brief and Appendix for the United States at 1, Doe v. United States (Doe III), 833 F.3d 
192 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1967-cr). For a discussion of the oral argument, which took place on 
April 7, 2016, see Margaret Love, Federal Expungement Case Argued in Court of Appeals, 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (Apr. 8, 2016), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/ 
04/08/federal-expungement-case-argued-in-court-of-appeals/#more-9308 (discussing the 
government’s arguments on appeal). 
 17  See Doe III, 833 F.3d at 199 (holding that the lower court lacked authority to expunge 
Doe’s conviction).  
 18  See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department Announces $110 Million for Reentry 
Programs; Efforts to Reduce Spending on Corrections (Oct. 8, 2010), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
department-announces-110-million-reentry-programs-efforts-reduce-spending-corrections; see 
also Doe v. United States (Doe II), 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (describing the 
“Smart on Crime” initiative of the Department of Justice, one of whose goals is to assist those 
with a criminal record in reentering society successfully). 
 19  Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 20  Id.  
 21  Id. at 572. As Judge Dearie noted, Stephenson became a victim of her professional 
attainment; her success prevented her from demonstrating the need for an expungement. Id. at 
571. 
 22  Id. (“As the Court that sentenced Ms. Stephenson over twenty years ago, I am hopeful that 
a licensing board will take seriously my conclusion that Ms. Stephenson is of sound moral 
character and well-suited for the nursing profession.”). 
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judiciary to revisit the standard for expungement to allow a criminal record 
to be expunged even in less than “exceptional” cases.23 
In March of 2016, Judge Gleeson again faced a request for 
expungement, for a thirteen-year-old fraud conviction.24 He denied the 
motion, finding that the petitioner’s “situation does not amount to the 
‘extreme circumstances’ that merit expungement.”25 In addition, he noted 
that “it is not clear to me that expungement would significantly help Doe, 
as her conviction will still appear on her nursing license and in private 
criminal record databases.”26 
The petitioner in Doe II had participated in a fraudulent scheme 
similar to the one in Doe I, and Judge Gleeson sentenced her in 2003 after a 
jury trial.27 In the intervening years, Doe frequently attempted to find 
employment as a nurse but was regularly rejected when the potential 
employer either found out about her criminal record or about the 
determination of professional misconduct by the New York State Office of 
Professional Discipline, which was based on the conviction.28 Judge 
Gleeson found Doe rehabilitated on his review of the entire record, and 
proceeded to issue a “federal certificate of rehabilitation.”29 He stated that 
this certificate symbolizes that “the same court that held Doe accountable 
for her criminal acts has now concluded after careful scrutiny that she is 
rehabilitated. In other words, the Court is recommending that she be 
welcomed to participate in society in the ways the rest of us do.”30 Judge 
Gleeson’s decision is couched in his understanding of the Obama 
administration’s efforts to be “Smart on Crime,” which includes “help[ing] 
people with criminal records find and keep jobs.”31 
These four cases illustrate the role judges can play in changing law 
and in mitigating the harshness of our current criminal justice system. The 
judicial opposition displayed here to disproportionate sentences and 
collateral consequences, however, also starkly reveals its limitations. 
Judicial resistance to the collateral consequences regime cannot deliver a 
 
 23  Id. at 572; see also Morris, supra note 1, at 296–98 (discussing Judge Weinstein’s way of 
addressing different constituencies in his decisions). On President Obama’s pardon record, see 
Nora V. Demleitner, Implementing Change in Sentencing and Corrections: The Need for Broad-
Based Research, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 303, 303–04 (2016) (noting that President Obama has the 
worst record on pardons of any president since 1900, save both Presidents Bush). 
 24  Doe II, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 25  Id. at 429. 
 26  Id. at 441. 
 27  Id. at 434. 
 28  See id. at 434–37 (discussing Doe’s attempts to find and maintain employment). 
 29  Id. at 442. 
 30  Id. at 445. 
 31  See id. at 429. 
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real punch; judges are limited to shadowboxing. Part I of this response 
focuses on the increasing judicial resistance to the various ways in which 
the U.S. criminal justice system imposes severe sanctions that reverberate 
through families and communities and negatively impact the country. Part 
II indicates how even judicial critics of the current approach remain a part 
of the overall normative framework that has dominated the societal 
discourse on punishment over the last four decades. Even though a 
bipartisan consensus appears to have developed nationally that some 
offenders have been overpunished and that at least some of those released 
from a criminal justice sanction should be given the tools to reenter 
effectively, not all offenders seem to benefit from this changed viewpoint. 
This Part critically assesses some of the new hallmarks defining the 
“worthy” offender, as exemplified in the aforementioned decisions and in 
recent and proposed changes to the sentencing system. This dichotomy 
between the worthy and the unworthy may lead to the imposition of a new 
and more stringent approach toward a group of offenders—those labeled 
violent criminals, sex offenders, and terrorists—considered the most 
dangerous. Even though more discretion for judges may alleviate some of 
the system’s harshness, it will not negate the unforgiving, security-driven 
approach we, as a country, have taken toward those who have run afoul of 
the law. 
I 
JUDICIAL OPPOSITION TO SEVERE SANCTIONS  
AND COLLATERAL IMPACT 
This Part details the alternative ways in which the four decisions 
above struggle with and against the harshness of the current sentencing and 
collateral consequences regime. It highlights judicial constraints as well as 
the creativity displayed by the judges in these cases. By focusing on the 
severity of the consequences that befall anyone with a criminal record even 
outside the formal sanction imposed, Part I displays the interplay required 
between the three branches of government to alleviate these consequences. 
Judges are bound by legal rules—statutes and precedent—but they 
have the ability to construe them—even expansively—in individual cases. 
This is part of a judge’s traditional role, despite the headlines Judge 
Gleeson made in Doe I when he critiqued the government’s opposition to 
the expungement he ultimately granted.32 Partly, he seemed concerned 
about the random or at least inconsistent approach the government has 
taken to such disqualifications.33 In Doe II he revisited this critique in a 
 
 32  See Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 456–57 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 33  See id. at 457 (contrasting this case with one in which “the United States Attorney urged 
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different way, by pointing out the apparent disconnect between the 
Department of Justice’s overall policy and the action of the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office in this case.34 
More importantly, in Doe I Judge Gleeson asked his fellow judges to 
revisit their restrictive attitude toward expungement. In fact, he 
characterized their “seemingly automatic refusals . . . to expunge 
convictions” for the purpose of assisting with employment efforts as 
“increasingly out of step with public opinion.”35 His call for greater judicial 
involvement in allowing offenders a path to effective reentry is not unlike 
the one for which Judge Weinstein and Jason Cade are asking. In contrast 
to non-deportation orders, judges have authority to issue expungements—
though within a restrictive framework.36 As one commentator has noted in a 
slightly different context, “[h]istory has shown that both lawyers and 
judges will seek to avoid the application of laws which are considered to be 
unduly harsh.”37 
All three judges share a belief in proportionality, though their analysis 
plays out in different contexts. While Judge Weinstein considers the 
proportionality between offense severity, the offender’s overall 
background, and the impact of deportation on U.S. citizen children on the 
one hand, and threatened deportation in conjunction with the criminal 
justice sanction on the other, the other two judges confront the 
proportionality between the offense type and the offender’s subsequent 
actions and background with the impact on her long-term employment—
and reintegration—opportunities. The failure of proportionality and equity 
in these cases animates the judges’ calls for legal change. Judge Weinstein 
implicitly, and Judges Dearie and Gleeson explicitly, called for legal 
changes in their decisions.38 While Judge Weinstein may have held out 
 
[Judge Gleeson] to allow the defendant to continue to work as a tax preparer without any notice to 
his clients of his recent conviction for being a fraudulent tax preparer”). 
 34  See Doe II, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 428–33, 437–41 (discussing the DOJ’s reform-minded 
policies regarding criminal reentry and the government’s seemingly inconsistent argument that 
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Doe’s motion for expungement). 
 35  Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 457.  
 36  For a discussion of ancillary jurisdiction to effect an equitable expungement, see Doe II, 
168 F. Supp. 3d at 437–41. See also Raj Mukherji, In Search of Redemption: Expungement of 
Federal Criminal Records (May 1, 2013) (unpublished comment) (on file with the Seton Hall 
University eRepository) http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/163 (discussing the 
different bases for federal expungements). 
 37  Arie Freiberg, Guerrillas in Our Midst? Judicial Responses to Governing the Dangerous, 
in DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL ORDER 51, 66 (Mark Brown & John 
Pratt eds., 2000). 
 38  See Doe II, F. Supp. 3d at 445–46 (urging the adoption of a federal system for issuing 
certificates of rehabilitation); Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015) (urging all three branches of federal government to change polices to reduce the collateral 
consequences of criminal sentences); United States v. Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d 468, 470–71, 
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hope—however unlikely—that his decision would have some impact on a 
government agency, the other two judges were the final decision makers in 
the cases at issue, though subject to appellate review. Judge Dearie partially 
echoed and amplified Judge Gleeson’s call for greater judicial involvement 
in granting expungements and for a less restrictive DOJ policy.39 He also 
called on Congress to change federal legislation on expungements and on 
the President to issue more pardons, especially to those whose sentences 
are already completed.40 In Doe II, Judge Gleeson called on Congress to 
pass legislation creating “a robust federal certification system [that] could 
include an enforceable presumption of rehabilitation, as is offered in New 
York, and return federal rights to those with state or federal convictions on 
their records.”41 
Questions over the application and fairness of the laws at issue in 
these cases are overshadowed by the larger issue of judicial power over 
punishments and—now increasingly—over collateral sanctions and 
consequences. This struggle has been playing out in different ways. When 
the Court declared the federal sentencing guidelines advisory,42 it found an 
avenue to allow judges to mitigate some of the harshness and 
restrictiveness that many members of the federal judiciary had criticized 
over the years.43 The extent to which judges sentence outside the 
guidelines’ range, and therefore take advantage of the greater discretion 
allocated to them, differs around the country.44 
 
481–82 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (outlining Judge Weinstein’s approach and the considerations going into 
the final sentence). 
 39  Stephenson, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 572 (citing Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 457) (suggesting the 
judiciary revisit the standard for granting expungement); Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 457 (calling 
for a fresh look at policies hindering reentry and the judicial tendency to refuse expungement 
when the only ground is inability to find employment). 
 40  Stephenson, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 572.  
 41  Doe II, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 445. 
 42  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 43  See, e.g., Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment, THE ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-case-
for-judgment/463380/ (profiling Judge Coughenour, an outspoken critic of the guidelines); John 
Nichols, Judge Resigns over Congressional Meddling, THE NATION (June 25, 2003) (describing 
Judge John Martin’s decision to leave the bench in part because of Congressional meddling in 
federal sentencing decisions). 
 44  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES 
V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 75–91 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/research/ 
congressional-reports/2012-report-congress-continuing-impact-united-states-v-booker-federal-
sentencing (analyzing post-Booker sentencing data and concluding that the influence of the 
guidelines varies by circuit and that rates of below-range sentences have increased). For some of 
Judge Weinstein’s principled opposition to aspects of guideline sentencing (and other matters in 
the criminal justice system), see, for example, United States v. R.V., 157 F. Supp. 3d 207 
(E.D.N.Y. 2016). In that case, which involved a download of child pornography, Judge Weinstein 
rejected a prison term under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). Id. at 251–52, 255–58; see also Kate Stith, 
 
November 2016] JUDICIAL CHALLENGES  159 
 
While sentencing remains crucial to federal courts, with ongoing 
debates about the breadth and depth of judicial discretion when a panoply 
of mandatory minimum sentences remains on the books, some of the 
attention has been focused on collateral sanctions.45 Among these sanctions 
are harsh immigration consequences, which follow automatically from 
certain convictions, not unlike mandatory minimum prison sentences, and 
impediments to reentry in the form of collateral sanctions. 
While the judiciary cannot grant itself powers of which Congress has 
explicitly divested it, such as the power to grant JRADs, there are 
workarounds: In Padilla v. Kentucky,46 for example, the Supreme Court 
found an alternative avenue to potentially mitigate some of the harsh 
consequences of a conviction for immigrants.47 Requiring counsel to inform 
a client about potential immigration consequences before deciding on a 
plea offer appears to be one of many (small) judicial steps designed to trim 
back collateral sanctions; other steps can be seen in recent decisions 
restricting the reach of sex offender registration statutes.48 
The four decisions out of the Eastern District can be interpreted as part 
of the judicial effort to mitigate the severity of the consequences of a 
 
Weinstein on Sentencing, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 214, 214 (2012) (describing Weinstein’s 
sentencing jurisprudence and criticisms of the guidelines). 
 45  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING Art. 6X, §§ 6x.01–.06 (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014) (submitting draft update of Model Penal Code with proposed new 
provisions on collateral consequences to American Law Institute members for consideration at 
annual meeting).  
 46  559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 47  See id. at 360, 366 (holding that advice regarding deportation is not outside the scope of 
representation required by the Sixth Amendment); cf. Freiberg, supra note 37, at 58–63 (noting 
that Anglo-Australian judges have developed a variety of techniques to mitigate unduly harsh 
laws). 
 48  For examples of other courts modifying collateral sanctions, see Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 
696, 706 (6th Cir. 2016) (declaring retroactive application of amendments to Michigan’s Sex 
Offender Registration Statute in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123, 124 (Md. 2013) (invalidating retroactive sex offender 
registration requirements under the state ex post facto clause); Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 
305 P.3d 1004, 1030 (Okla. 2013) (same); In the Interest of J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 2 (Pa. 2014) 
(holding that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act violates juvenile offenders’ due 
process rights because of its use of an irrebuttable presumption). Despite some initial lower court 
decisions expanding Padilla to other collateral sanctions, so far Padilla has largely remained 
cabined. See, e.g., State v. Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267, 1276–77 (Utah 2014) (declaring sex offender 
registration statutes civil and therefore not covered by the Sixth Amendment); State v. LeMere, 
879 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Wis. 2016) (denying expansion of the Padilla exception and thus holding 
that the Sixth Amendment does not require defense counsel to inform a client that entering a plea 
to a sexually violent offense can result in civil commitment). In a recent sentencing decision in 
the Eastern District of New York, Judge Block issued a non-incarcerative sentence, well below 
the applicable guideline range, in recognition of the debilitating set of collateral consequences 
facing the defendant. See United States v. Nesbeth, No. 15-CR-18, 2016 WL 3022073, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-2081 (2d Cir. June 22, 2016). 
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criminal conviction beyond sentencing. Judge Weinstein, in many ways, 
fights the most uphill battle as he issues recommendations to an 
administrative agency that appear pointless—the recommendations have no 
binding legal effect—though they may bring some relief in the occasional 
case.49 Judge Gleeson, on the other hand, issued a decision fully within his 
powers in Doe I, though he was ultimately reversed.50 In Doe II, he created 
a federal certificate of rehabilitation that previously had not existed.51 
While some have argued that legislative efforts to constrain judicial 
discretion have been indicative of the public’s lack of confidence in the 
judiciary,52 in the United States, at least, the pendulum may have swung 
back. As the executive and legislative branches have begun to reverse some 
of the harsh sentencing legislation put in place throughout the last thirty 
years, the judiciary may be well-positioned to reinforce and even accelerate 
that course. The three branches of government may be more ideologically 
unified on that issue, therefore permitting greater judicial discretion. 
II 
THE NEW PARADIGM OF THE DESERVING OFFENDER:  
NONVIOLENT, CRIME-FREE, AND  WORKING 
Since 2010, the magnitude of the U.S. prison system and the racialized 
make-up of the correctional population have focused public attention on 
criminal justice policy, the cost of the current regime, and the need for 
more effective reentry efforts.53 State prison systems have become more 
challenging to fund in the wake of the economic recession of 2008.54 Even 
in the federal system, the Bureau of Prisons takes up an ever-larger share of 
the Department of Justice budget, at the expense of law enforcement and 
 
 49  See Stith, supra note 44, at 215 (indicating that Judge Weinstein’s decisions have received 
at best a mixed reception at the Second Circuit, but the government has failed to appeal many of 
them). 
 50 Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2016), rev’g Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 456–
57 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying order expunging Doe’s conviction).  
 51  See Doe II, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 52  See Freiberg, supra note 37, at 67 (“Judges and penal authorities are now less trusted. . . . 
The first legislative riposte has therefore been to further remove judicial discretion . . . .”). 
 53  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (focusing on the racialized makeup of the prison population); 
THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION AND DISCOURSE ON CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE ISSUES 1 (2014), https://opportunityagenda.org/files/field_file/ 
2014.08.23-CriminalJusticeReport-FINAL_0.pdf (describing the American public discourse on 
criminal justice issues). 
 54  See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE SPENDING FOR 
CORRECTIONS: LONG-TERM TRENDS AND RECENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REFORMS 4 
(2013), https://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
State%20Spending%20for%20Corrections.pdf (describing the effect of the recession on 
corrections spending). 
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prosecution.55 Consequently, a broad coalition from all sides of the political 
spectrum has begun to work on alternatives, largely with a focus on what 
are described as “nonviolent drug offenders.”56 For this group, a treatment-
based approach appears to replace the previously prevalent punishment 
model.57 
There seems to be a growing consensus that nonviolent offenders, 
including nonviolent drug offenders, may not have to be imprisoned—and 
certainly not for the length of time they have been spending in prison.58 On 
the other hand, despite growing awareness of the scope and breadth of 
collateral sanctions over the last two decades,59 legislative changes have 
been limited. Indeed, collateral sanctions—particularly those imposed on 
sex offenders and some violent offenders—continue to proliferate.60  The 
broadest movement against collateral consequences, which has achieved a 
substantial following in the states, the federal government, and many 
communities and large corporations, focuses on “Banning the Box.”61 It 
 
 55  See, e.g., NANCY G. LA VIGNE & JULIE SAMUELS, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE GROWTH 
& INCREASING COST OF THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM: DRIVERS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 2 
(2012), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/growth-increasing-cost-federal-prison-system-
drivers-and-potential-solutions (noting that the growing Federal Bureau of Prisons budget crowds 
out other DOJ spending). 
 56  Many of the proposals to change federal sentences currently pending in Congress focus 
solely on nonviolent drug offenders. See generally Nora V. Demleitner, Alternative Visions for 
the Federal Criminal Justice and Corrections System: Is True Change Possible?, 28 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 121 (2015) (discussing proposed changes to federal sentencing and other criminal justice 
policies designed to decrease the federal prison population).  
 57  See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 4 (2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/ndcs_2014.pdf 
(outlining a treatment-based approach for drug offenders); A Drug Policy for the 21st Century, 
THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/drugpolicyreform (last visited Sept. 24, 
2016, 6:24 PM) (same). 
 58  The changes in federal sentencing for crack offenders, including the release of those 
imprisoned, have been indicative of this change. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified in notes to scattered sections of 21, 28 U.S.C.); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPACT OF THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 
2010 (2015); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENSIBLE SENTENCING REFORM: THE 2014 
REDUCTION OF DRUG SENTENCES, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/backgrounders/profile_2014_drug_amendment.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
 59  See Project Description, supra note 6 (collecting, for the first time, collateral 
consequences of conviction in one place).  
 60  See, e.g., Karen J. Terry, Sex Offender Laws in the United States: Smart Policy or 
Disproportionate Sanctions?, 39 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 113 (2015) (discussing 
enhanced sanctions against sex offenders). 
 61  See, e.g., MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT HIRING POLICIES (2016), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf 
(describing the Ban the Box movement); Joshua Gaines, Vermont Becomes the 8th State to Ban 
the Box in Private Employment, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (May 5, 2016), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/05/05/vermont-becomes-8th-state-to-ban-the-box-in-private-
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asks employers to dispense with questions about an applicant’s criminal 
record on employment applications. After all, the argument for getting 
offenders back to work seems unassailable: It would allow them to become 
self-sufficient and, as studies indicate, therefore less likely to recidivate.62 
According to this point of view, those with a criminal record who 
deserve public support are nonviolent offenders with a work history, or at 
least a strong desire to work. In addition, they should show little or no 
likelihood of recidivating, or perhaps even have proven their law-abiding 
nature. The judicial decisions from the Eastern District reinforce these 
elements, characterizing this type of person with a criminal record as 
worthy of a special reprieve. 
The next sections analyze the characteristics of these “worthy” 
offenders. They highlight the historical and cultural contingency of the 
definition of “nonviolent” and of the characteristics that render a person 
with a criminal record deserving. 
A.  Defining the Nonviolent Offender 
The four offenders from the Eastern District are nonviolent, at least as 
characterized in the decisions. The definition of “violent” and the 
classification of individual offenders as such, however, have often turned 
out to be challenging.63 Drug offenders have generally been grouped with 
violent offenders, a connection that is now being loosened in the discourse 
about the nonviolent drug offender.64 
The type of car crashes at issue in both Doe cases may lead to physical 
injury and even death.65 Under the residual clause struck down in United 
 
and-public-employment/#more-9789 (detailing Vermont’s Ban the Box efforts). 
 62  See, e.g., John M. Nally, Susan Lockwood, Taiping Ho & Katie Knutson, Post-Release 
Recidivism and Employment Among Different Types of Released Offenders: A 5-Year Follow-up 
Study in the United States, 9 INT’L J. CRIM. JUST. SCI. 16, 29 (2014) (finding that education and 
post-release employment significantly correlate with recidivism). 
 63  See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555–57 (2015) (declaring the 
residual clause under § 924(e)(2)(B), which defined a crime of violence as “otherwise involv[ing] 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” unconstitutionally 
vague); Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Adopts 
Amendment to Definition of “Crime of Violence” in Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Proposes 
Additional Amendments (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/ 
january-8-2016 (adopting amendment eliminating the residual clause in federal sentencing 
guidelines and revising the list of enumerated offenses that constitute crimes of violence). 
 64  See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, Justice Department Set to Free 6,000 Prisoners, Largest One-Time 
Release, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/justice-department-about-to-free-6000-prisoners-largest-one-time-release/2015/10/06/ 
961f4c9a-6ba2-11e5-aa5b-f78a98956699_story.html (describing policy changes displaying 
lenience toward nonviolent drug offenders). 
 65  See, e.g., Bruce Mandelbilt, Fake Auto Accidents a Deadly Scam, NEWSMAX (Nov. 2, 
2007), http://www.newsmax.com/US/fake-auto-accidents/2007/11/02/id/322070/ (noting that 
 
November 2016] JUDICIAL CHALLENGES  163 
 
States v. Johnson,66 which defined a crime of violence as conduct 
presenting a serious potential risk of injury to another,67 these crimes may 
have been categorized as violent.68  That may explain why, in 
characterizing the offense in Doe I as nonviolent, Judge Gleeson 
emphasizes that it was committed almost as a measure of desperation, 
perhaps to improve the lives of Doe’s four children.69 
Similarly, some have argued that document forging, like the crime at 
issue in Aguilar, could amount to support for terrorism. After all, some 
terrorists have bought false documents.70 Most, however, would deem 
frauds, theft offenses, and now drug crimes—at least those that do not 
include the use of violence—as nonviolent, often in stark contrast to those 
classified as terrorism, violent crimes, and sex crimes.71 
While Professor Cade critiques the Obama Administration’s approach 
as overly punitive toward all those with a criminal record, he specifically 
names those who have only been arrested, misdemeanants, and those 
having received a pardon, expungement, or deferred adjudication as most 
deserving of the exercise of discretion, perhaps because the criminal justice 
system labels these offenders either ultimately not culpable or the least 
culpable.72 Cade’s emphasis may be interpreted to mean that only low-
level, nonviolent offenders should benefit from proportionality review and 
the exercise of favorable discretion. 
Many legislative proposals focus solely on the nonviolent offender.73 
Not only does that fail to appreciate classificatory challenges, it 
 
staged car accidents can cause injury and death). 
 66  135 S. Ct. at 2555–57. 
 67  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012), invalidated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015). 
 68  See supra note 63. 
 69  See Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing Doe’s financial struggles 
prior to committing the offense). 
 70  See, e.g., Identification Documents Fraud and the Implications for Homeland Security: 
Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Homeland Security, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of 
John S. Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI) (discussing prevalence of 
document forgery and its connection to terrorism). 
 71  While all three of these groups are treated substantially more harshly than nonviolent 
offenders, the latter two are singled out for special treatment. Sex offenders, for example, are 
being subjected to debilitating collateral sanctions. See, e.g., TRACY VELÁZQUEZ, VERA INST. OF 
JUSTICE, THE PURSUIT OF SAFETY: SEX OFFENDER POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2008) 
(discussing enhanced sanctions against sex offenders); Terry, supra note 60 (same). 
 72  In his defense, Professor Cade argues that personal equities may overcome even a more 
substantial criminal record, though the government would also be able to make a showing of 
dangerousness, for example, to justify a deportation. See Cade, supra note 1, at 59–61.  
 73  See Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 453 nn.12–13 (referencing bills in New York and in 
Congress that would lead to expungement of criminal records for nonviolent, first-time 
offenders). 
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misapprehends the trajectory of many offenders, and ultimately creates 
another new and less redeemable class of offenders—violent offenders, sex 
offenders, and terrorists—who are singled out as undeserving of any 
benefits. Just as use of a criminal record sweeps too broadly in the 
deportation context, distinctions between nonviolent and violent offenders 
may conceal as much as they reveal differences between individual cases. 
B.  Past and Future Criminal Behavior 
The second element that makes an offender redeemable is her law-
abiding character, aside from the conviction at issue. All four Eastern 
District decisions highlight this characteristic. None of the offenders had a 
criminal record prior to the offense of which they had been convicted, and 
none have run afoul of the law since their conviction; despite both these 
factors, the Does have faced substantial difficulty in regaining economic 
self-sufficiency.74 In light of the recency of Aguilar’s criminal conduct, 
Judge Weinstein has to rely solely on the absence of a criminal record, 
noting that “[t]he crime charged appears to be a deviation from an 
otherwise legal way of life.”75 Professor Cade implies the importance of a 
crime-free life with his examples of pardons, expungements, and deferred 
adjudications, all of which are frequently based on proof—or 
assumptions—of individuals leading a crime-free life since (and sometimes 
even before) their convictions. 
Recidivism has become the hallmark of release decisions and of 
judging the success of diversionary and treatment programs.76 While U.S. 
recidivism studies may often use questionable measuring sticks,77 there is 
general agreement on many of the factors that contribute to recidivism. 
Among those are extent of criminal history and conduct in prison, but also 
demographic data including age and sex.78 
In the Eastern District cases, the offenders’ demographic 
characteristics made it less likely that they would commit offenses going 
 
 74  See, e.g., Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“Importantly, Ms. Stephenson has had no runs-ins with law enforcement since her conviction.”). 
 75  United States v. Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d 468, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 76  See Nora V. Demleitner, How to Change the Philosophy and Practice of Probation and 
Supervised Release: Data Analytics, Cost Control, Focus on Reentry, and a Clear Mission, 28 
FED. SENT’G REP. 231, 232 (2016) [hereinafter Demleitner, How to Change] (referring to the 
reduction of recidivism as “the apparent goal of the efforts to improve supervisory mechanisms”). 
 77  See, e.g., id. at 236–37 (2016) (discussing how recidivism studies lack a “commonly 
accepted yardstick” when measuring success, and criticizing current metrics). 
 78  See, e.g., Recidivism Report, FLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS (May 2001), 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/recidivism/2001/factors.html (analyzing factors that contribute to 
recidivism). 
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forward. Aguilar was thirty-seven at the time of sentencing,79 generally an 
age at which the likelihood of criminal involvement is already limited and 
will continue to decline substantially going forward.80 The Does and 
Stephenson are in their fifties and forties, respectively.81 They are also 
female, the gender with the lesser likelihood of reoffending.82 
The Does’s and Stephenson’s convictions occurred thirteen, thirteen, 
and twenty-two years before they sought expungement, respectively.83 
Depending on age and criminal history, the risk that an offender will 
recidivate ten years after release from confinement—a timeframe exceeded 
in these cases—is the same as for a person without a criminal record.84 
Therefore, these women were not any more likely to commit a crime than 
anyone else with similar demographic characteristics. 
The length of time from the convictions until the requests for 
expungement indicates the long-term impact of a criminal conviction and 
its debilitating nature throughout. Even though the female offenders in 
these cases were not removed from the country, the collateral consequences 
of their convictions severely restricted them in their ability to engage fully 
as persons, citizens, and economic agents. 
Aguilar carried a higher risk of recidivism, but even though Judge 
Weinstein did not discuss this issue in any detail, he implied the defendant 
was unlikely to commit another offense. In part, Aguilar’s long and 
impressive work history serves as a protection against reoffending.85 Judge 
 
 79  Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 481. 
 80  Age also served as a protective factor for both Does and for Stephenson. See Laura M. 
Baber & Mark Motivans, Expanding Our Knowledge About Recidivism of Persons on Federal 
Supervision, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2013, at 23, 26 (pointing to increased age as a factor that 
decreases risk of recidivism).  
 81  See Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating that Doe was twenty-four 
years old in 1983); Doe II, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (stating that Doe was fifty-
seven years old); Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating 
that Stephenson was twenty-five years old in 1993). 
 82  For some discussion of re-offending in the federal system, see Baber & Motivans, supra 
note 80, at 26 (noting that male gender is among several factors identified as increasing risk of 
committing new offenses or having supervision revoked). 
 83  Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 455 (stating that Doe was sentenced thirteen years earlier); Doe 
II, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 446 (stating that Doe was sentenced thirteen years earlier); Stephenson, 139 
F. Supp. 3d at 567 (stating that Stephenson was sentenced over twenty-two years earlier). 
 84  See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, ‘Redemption’ in the Presence of 
Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 10 (2009) (providing actuarial 
assessment of “redemption” period after which risk of rearrest mirrors that of the general 
population); Shawn D. Bushway, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of 
Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 
CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28 (2011) (finding ten year redemption period for younger offenders and 
shorter timeframe for older offenders; those with a long criminal history, however, may never 
reach the same reduced risk level as those without a criminal record). 
 85  See Baber & Motivans, supra note 80, at 26 (listing unemployment as a factor increasing 
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Weinstein also noted the defendant’s strong family connection, describing 
the extent to which his wife and sons depended on him—a potent motivator 
not to recidivate.86 
The presence of factors correlated with reduced recidivism does not 
matter, however, under the current regime. Deportation, after all, is the one 
collateral sanction that is assumed to make reoffending impossible by 
exiling the offender.87 Other collateral sanctions as well as indirect effects 
of a criminal record, such as those discussed in Doe I and II and in 
Stephenson, may lead to further offending rather than counteracting it. 
Therefore, expungements long after release from a criminal conviction may 
generally come much too late, though obviously may still be desired by 
individual offenders such as the three women here. 
Within the criminal justice system actuarial risk assessments to 
determine the likelihood of future criminal conduct have increasingly 
gained traction.88 While Professor Cade seems to put his stock in 
discretionary decisionmaking, it might be helpful to consider the use of risk 
assessment tools in making the decisions for which he asks. In fact, those 
tools may be more effective in predicting recidivism—to the extent that 
should be an important factor in determining whether an offender should be 
deported—than either congressional expansiveness with respect to 
deportation grounds or entirely discretionary decisions of a variety of 
 
the risk of recidivism). None of the offenders at issue had personal factors that increased the 
likelihood of reoffending. Those include longer criminal histories, indications of substantial abuse 
problems or mental health issues. Id. In other studies, done for other purposes and with different 
populations, factors relevant to reoffending may differ. See, e.g., BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 6 (2002) (finding that only 
gender and factors associated with prior criminal record proved relevant with respect to reoffense 
risk of nonviolent offenders in Virginia). 
 86  See Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 470. Similarly, Judge Dearie notes that Stephenson is 
“married and is raising three daughters.” Stephenson, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 567.  
 87  First, recidivism studies in the United States focus on intra-country—and, in many cases, 
on intra-state—reoffending. See, e.g., Recidivism Report, supra note 78 (analyzing state-wide 
recidivism data). Offending within prison walls, similar to offending abroad, is not being 
considered. Second, a fair number of deportees will return to the United States. Reentry upon 
deportation is a federal offense and therefore will be counted as a new offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 
(2012) (making illegal reentry an offense); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (making illegal reentry 
following deportation after conviction of an aggravated felony an offense); U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, ILLEGAL REENTRY OFFENSES (Apr. 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/immigration/2015_Illegal-Reentry-
Report.pdf (summarizing relevant statutory landscape of reentry offenses).  
 88  See, e.g., NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44087, RISK AND NEEDS 
ASSESSMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2015); PAMELA M. CASEY, ROGER K. 
WARREN & JENNIFER K. ELEK, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING 6 (2011), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/ 
Microsites/Files/CSI/RNA%20Guide%20Final.ashx (noting that research has demonstrated that 
use of risk assessment tools can lead to reduction in recidivism). 
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individual actors. In fact, diversion, one of the potential markers against 
deportation, is at least in some states already supported by evidence-based 
decisionmaking.89 While many concerns have been raised with respect to 
such assessments, they may function as a helpful supplemental tool—in 
conjunction with individual judicial and administrative discretion—in 
selecting those who should presumptively not be deported. 
C.  Relevance of Work Record, Work Ethic, and Having Children 
Even though the underlying offense and the offender’s otherwise clean 
record have been important in the Eastern District cases, the judges focus 
explicitly on two other issues that appear to carry great weight. Both are 
activities that society values greatly: raising children and engaging in or 
seeking work. In addition, Judge Weinstein explicitly addresses the impact 
of the collateral consequence on the defendant’s family and ultimately on 
society.90 
For many judges, a crucial element in recommending more lenient 
sentences or otherwise exercising discretion in favor of an offender is the 
person’s work history. As the “Ban the Box” movement indicates, work has 
become the sine qua non of reentry. Work is being hailed as a protector 
against recidivism, even though not all studies confirm that view.91 Perhaps 
more importantly, this emphasis on work accords with the American belief 
in self-sufficiency and the rejection of public support, elements Judge 
Gleeson noted positively about Doe in Doe I.92 After all, Doe seeks the 
Judge’s help because she wants to work and does not want to be on public 
assistance. Her challenges also indicate that building a work history is not 
solely within the individual’s power, but depends on wider economic, legal, 
and societal conditions. 
As both Doe cases and Stephenson display, the work argument likely 
carries the most practical and ideologically persuasive import with respect 
 
 89  See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 85, at 1–8 (describing how Virginia’s sentencing 
commission has developed a risk assessment that provides empirical guidance for judicial 
diversion decisions). The data-driven approach still allows for judicial discretion.  
 90  See Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 472–80. 
 91  See L’ANN DURAN ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., INTEGRATED 
REENTRY AND EMPLOYMENT STRATEGIES 2 (2013), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/09/Final.Reentry-and-Employment.pp_.pdf (describing the “complicated 
relationship” between work and recidivism). 
 92  The Probation Department’s documentation indicates that Doe “wants very much to work 
[and] detests being on public assistance . . . .” Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); 
see also Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (describing 
Stephenson as “hardworking” and pointing out that she began to work “immediately” after her 
sentence); Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 470, 482 (detailing the defendant’s long work history in the 
United States, including his positions and salary as well as commendations by his employers). 
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to the abolition, or at least the decrease, of debilitating collateral sanctions 
for citizens. Both Doe cases may carry this argument yet a step further. In 
each case, the prior offense seemed to relate—albeit superficially—to the 
type of employment sought. Judge Gleeson, however, indicated that this 
categorization sweeps too broadly, perhaps a cautionary argument 
generally against broad statutory employment restrictions.93 
In the deportation context, the work argument will not persuade, 
especially not for those like Aguilar who worked illegally—though Judge 
Weinstein notes that Aguilar “was consistently employed . . . for fifteen 
years up until his arrest. He paid his income taxes . . . regularly.”94 Judge 
Weinstein, therefore, turns to another argument that has been legally 
somewhat relevant in the immigration area but not generally in the criminal 
justice realm: protection of U.S.-citizen children. 
Judge Weinstein indicates that going forward “this court will issue a 
‘non-deportation’ recommendation to the immigration judge . . . [w]here 
credible evidence has been proffered demonstrating that deportation is 
likely to unreasonably traumatize United States-born children.”95 He 
marshals an impressive amount of sociological and psychological research 
indicating the magnitude of parental deportations today and their impact on 
U.S.-citizen children.96 The law assumes that the choice is the migrant’s 
whether to take the children with him to his home country or have them 
grow up apart in the United States.97 In either case, the psychological and 
sociological effects are substantial, though many reject consideration of 
such effects on the grounds that the parent should have taken them into 
account before getting involved in crime.98 
 
 93  See Doe II, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Though the health care fraud 
conviction could obviously signal to nursing employers that she committed a crime on the job, 
that is not the case.”). 
 94  Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 470. 
 95  Id. at 470–71. Judge Weinstein does not make such recommendations in all deportation 
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Chong, 13-CR-570, 2014 WL 4773978, at *16 (no 
recommendation issued in case of childless non-citizen drug offender). 
 96  Aguilar, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 472–80. 
 97  See BOS. COLL. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND INT’L JUSTICE, THE PSYCHOSOCIAL 
IMPACT OF DETENTION AND DEPORTATION ON U.S. MIGRANT CHILDREN AND FAMILIES: A 
REPORT FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT 3 (2013), 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights/doc/IACHR%20Report%20on%20Pysc
hosocial%20Impact%20of%20Detention%20%20Deportation-FINAL%208-16-13.pdf (“When 
an unauthorized parent of a U.S.-citizen child is arrested, that parent must make . . . a ‘Solomonic 
decision’: He/she may move the child to a . . . foreign environment . . . or he/she may leave the 
child in the U.S. in the care of others.” (citations omitted)). 
 98  See Lauren Feig, Breaking the Cycle: A Family-Focused Approach to Criminal Sentencing 
in Illinois, 2015 ADVOCATES’ FORUM 13 (“It is said that offenders do not deserve special 
treatment just because they are parents and that they should have thought about how their actions 
could harm their child before committing the offense.”). 
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Many other countries have taken a different position by allowing 
consideration of family relationships and rootedness in society when 
deciding on deportations based on criminal offenses.99 U.S. immigration 
law, as Cade explains, no longer does so, and allows no actor in the system 
to weigh the equities.100 The same development characterized federal 
sentencing under mandatory guidelines when the offense at issue and the 
offender’s criminal record largely determined the sentence.101 In the 
meantime, research has been done documenting the negative impact of 
parental imprisonment—a close analogue to deportation. Maternal 
incarceration in particular negatively impacts the prisoner’s children, and at 
least in some cases also impacts other children.102 
In the end, Judge Dearie’s and Judge Weinstein’s decisions ask other 
actors that they exercise discretion in favor of the individuals in front of 
them as the impact of the collateral impact falls heavily on third parties—
Aguilar’s U.S.-citizen children and Stephenson’s potential future patients 
who are denied a good nurse—to the detriment of U.S. society. 
 
 99  See, e.g., LSE HUMAN RIGHTS FUTURES PROJECT, DEPORTATION AND THE RIGHT TO 
RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE UNDER ARTICLE 8 HRA 4 (2013), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/documents/2011/KlugDeportation.pdf (noting that family 
considerations are one factor the European Court of Human Rights uses to assess whether 
expulsion is justified under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act); see also Dimitra Blitsa et al., 
Criminal Records and Immigration: Comparing the United States and the European Union, 39 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 205, 234–38 (2015) (discussing impact of criminal records on immigration 
decisions in the European Union); Switzerland Rejects Proposal to Deport Foreigners for Minor 
Crimes, JOURNAL.IE (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.thejournal.ie/switzerland-referendum-
deporting-foreign-nationals-crime-2630551-Feb2016/ (discussing Swiss voters’ rejection of 
referendum that would have led to automatic deportation of even minor offenders, including 
misdemeanants, and abolish a JRAD equivalent). 
 100  See Cade, supra note 1, at 41 (“In short, under current law many noncitizens are detained, 
deported, and often permanently banished, without any adjudicative consideration being given to 
whether such extreme sanctions fit the underlying crime or comport with justice in light of the 
countervailing equities of the particular case.”). 
 101  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010) 
(noting that family ties are not typically relevant to sentencing decisions); see also Emily W. 
Andersen, “Not Ordinarily Relevant”: Bringing Family Responsibilities to the Federal 
Sentencing Table, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 1504 (2015) (arguing for a guideline amendment to 
permit sentencing courts to consider family ties and for the creation of family impact statements 
as part of the presentence investigation). 
 102  See John Hagan & Holly Foster, Children of the American Prison Generation: Student and 
School Spillover Effect of Incarcerating Mothers, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 37, 37 (2012). For some 
indication that not all children may be impacted negatively, see Kristin Turney & Christopher 
Wildeman, Detrimental for Some? Heterogeneous Effects of Maternal Incarceration on Child 
Wellbeing, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 125, 128–30 (2015). Some studies indicate that 
paternal incarceration may be more detrimental for children than maternal imprisonment. See 
Christopher Wildeman & Kristin Turney, Positive, Negative, or Null? The Effects of Maternal 
Incarceration on Children’s Behavioral Problems, 51 DEMOGRAPHY 1041, 1042 (2014). 
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CONCLUSION 
The heavy focus on the nature of the underlying offense, the 
likelihood of recidivating, and work history may imply that the underlying 
approach to offenders and crime may not (yet) have changed substantially. 
Despite their critical rhetoric and their demand on other actors in the 
system to exercise discretion because of positive equities, all three judges 
justify their decisions within the value structure that currently governs the 
criminal justice discourse: nonviolent crime, a crime-free life, and 
employment. As they are trying to persuade relevant actors, this approach 
may be the most promising in light of their institutional roles and 
constraints. For others, however, it should be important to keep in mind 
legal, economic, and social constraints that make Stephenson and both 
Does exemplary role models rather than set the expectation for all persons 
with a criminal record. 
As collateral consequences come under scrutiny and reentry efforts are 
being funded more generously, we may begin to see some, though still 
limited impact on the reintegration of offenders. Professor Cade and Judge 
Weinstein, however, have a longer struggle ahead of them. Statutory 
changes in the immigration system appear elusive, and most likely would 
not benefit those with a criminal record, and certainly not those convicted 
of crimes labeled violent, sexual, or terrorist, whatever their equities are. 
 
